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The Battered Woman Syndrome
and the Kentucky Criminal
Justice System: Abuse Excuse
or Legitimate Mitigation?
BY SUE E. McCLURE*
INTRODUCTIONC harlotte's husband beat her with an iron pipe while her
daughter watched from the closet. Johnette's husband nailed
her and their children inside the house. Martina's mate told her that he
did not know why anyone would want her. Traci's father broke her
kneecaps with a baseball bat. All four of these women killed their abusers
and all four received prison sentences for their actions.'
The four women described above characterize the escalating social
problem of domestic violence.2 Our society has permitted the marriage
license to function as a license to abuse;3 and then, if the victim kills the
abuser and submits evidence of abuse as a justification for the homicide,
society has dismissed this defense as the "abuse excuse." Society has
historically played a role m facilitating abuse and today may be beginning
to recogmze the need to understand and consider the effects of tis abuse
* Associate with Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tennessee. B.S.N. 1987,
J.D. 1996, Umversity of Kentucky.
'Tape of Female Inmates Seeking Clemency from Gov Brereton Jones
(on file with the Kentucky Dep't of Public Advocacy). Gov Jones granted
clemency to all four of these women. See znfra notes 141-55 and accompanying
text.
2 It is questionable whether domestic violence is escalating or is just
receiving more notoriety in today's society. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE
BATrERED WOMAN ix, 11 (1979) (explaining that "[t]he problem of battered
women has only come into the limelight m the past few years" and that
"[w]ife abuse has an ancient history") [hereinafter WALKER, THE BATrERED
WOMAN].
3 Id. at 13.
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on its victims. This Note evaluates Kentucky's response to battered
women who have committed homicide by killing their abusers.
Imtially, fis Note will provide a description of the underlying
psychological state of the abuse victim in order to later explain the
purpose of the current law in Kentucky pertaining to victims of domestic
violence who have become criminal defendants. Female victims of
domestic abuse often share a set of characteristics - this common
experience is known as the battered woman syndrome. The battered
woman syndrome is an important conceptual tool for abuse victims who
have become criminal defendants: it attempts to describe and explain the
state of mind experienced by these particular defendants prior to and at
the time they struck back at their abusers.
It remains unclear whether Kentucky law permits an abuse victim to
introduce evidence of battered woman syndrome to defend herself against
the charge that she committed a violent crime against her abuser. While
Kentucky statutes permit the consideration of domestic violence in
mitigation of certain offenses,4 there is an unfortunate lack of reported
case law and legislative history explaining the application of these
statutes. In order to bridge that gap and provide a fundamental under-
standing of the purpose and application of these laws, the author has
conducted interviews with many of the critical parties, except the abuser
and the abused defendant, involved in processing a case through the
crimmal justice system. Through these interviews emerges an understand-
ing of the perspectives with wich the judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, experts, and the parole board approach these cases.5 These
parties are diametrically opposed on some issues, but clearly each
4 Kentucky's self-defense statute, KY REv STAT. ANN. § 503.050
(Baldwin 1995), permits an abuse victim to introduce evidence of domestic
violence as part of a self-protection defense. Kentucky's probation statute, KY.
REV STAT. ANN. § 533.060 (Baldwin 1995), allows the court to consider
domestic violence in determining whether a victim of abuse (who committed a
violent crime against her abuser) is eligible for probation. The Kentucky parole
statutes, KY. REV STAT. ANN. §§ 439.3401 - .3402 (Baldwin 1995), direct the
parole board to consider domestic violence when weighing the release of an
abuse victim convicted of a violent crme against her abuser. See infra notes 93-
114 and accompanying text for a full analysis of these statutes.
5 This Note does not attempt to describe the perspectives of all judges,
attorneys, experts, and members of the parole board. The intent is to describe the
author's understanding of the comments offered by those people interviewed for
this Note as a representative sample of the parties involved in the criminal justice
system's treatment of domestic violence cases resulting in homicide.
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embraces the subject with passion and recognizes the need for the law to
adequately address the role of domestic violence as mitigation evidence.
This Note, therefore, explains the battered woman syndrome and attempts
to describe its status under Kentucky law
I. THE BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME
The laws dealing with domestic violence victims who have become
criminal defendants cannot be fully appreciated without a fundamental
understanding of the individuals to whom these laws apply The term
"battered woman syndrome" is a legal term, not a medical diagnosis.' It
is a "vehicle to assist women in explaining their experiences in the
context of a criminal trial dealing with a woman's use of force m self-
defense."7 Lenore Walker, the pioneer researcher of the battered woman
syndrome, defines a battered woman as "a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in
order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any
concern for her rights."'
There is a trend in the field of psychology to redefine the battered
woman syndrome.' This trend is an attempt to expand the original
concepts identified by Walker to account for the numerous ways in which
battered women respond to the abuse. The syndrome, as originally
defined, has proved confusing to the legal system and has caused a
backlash by some feminists.0 Medically, a syndrome is merely a "group
6 Interview with Dr. Sara Young, Psy. D., Private Practice, Center for
Psychological Health, in Lexington, Ky. (Mar. 22, 1996).
' Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the "Battered Woman's
Defense" Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 572
(1992).
8 WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at xv. A further
prerequisite to being classified as a battered woman is expenencingthe battering
cycle a mimmum of two times. Id.
' Dowd, supra note 7, at 577; Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's
Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome,
21 HOFsTRA L. REv 1191, 1193-94 (1993). See znfra notes 84-92 and
accompanying text.
'0 See Dowd, supra note 7, at 577 (explaining that feminsts view the use
of the term "syndrome" as causingbattered women to be labelled abnormal, thus
"absolv[ing] society of any responsibility for the battered woman's situation by
placing the blame on the victim").
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of symptoms which characterize [sic] a disordei."" One expert
believes that the battered woman syndrome should be viewed as "the
responses and characteristics of a normal woman who finds herself m a
defective or dysfunctional relationship, surrounded by the realities of life
confronting a woman today " 2 This refocuses the blame for the abuse
on the relationship, the batterer, and society, and not the victim. 3 As a
legal term of art the "battered woman syndrome" refers to the use of
expert testimony to explain the acts of the victim of abuse to the jury,
and to convey to the jury her state of mind as created by her experiences
as a battered woman.'4
Who are these battered women? 5 What leads them to abusive
relationships and keeps them there? What causes some of them to kill
their abusers? The stereotypical battered woman is "a small, fragile,
haggard person who might once have been pretty She has several small
children, no job skills, and is economically dependant on her hus-
band."16 She is assumed to live in poverty, belong to a minority group,
come from a violent background, and be both fearful and passive.' 7 This
stereotype is a myth. She is more likely to be your boss, your neighbor,
your secretary, your doctor. If you are female, there is a fifty percent
chance that she is you.'"
Dr. Walker's work developed the framework for the initial description
of the "themes" associated with domestic violence."9 Most battered
women studied by Dr. Walker were intelligent, well-educated - or at
least more educated than their batterer. They were competent women.20
" Id. at 577-78; see also Lenore E.A. Walker, Understanding Battered
Woman Syndrome, TRIAL, Feb. 1995, at 30, 32 (defining a syndrome as a
collection of symptoms).
12 Dowd, supra note 7, at 578.
13 id.
14 See id. at 574.
'" The author acknowledges that women are not the only .victims of
domestic violence and does not mean to diminish the pain and suffering
experienced by men who are subjected to such abuse. This Note refers to
domestic violence victims with female pronouns merely in an attempt at clarity,
consistency, and readability. The abuse of any individual, regardless of gender,
is a blight on society, and this author does not intend to minimize the suffering
of any class of victims.
16 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 18.
17 rd.
18 Id. at 19.
'9 Interview with Dr. Sara Young, supra note 6.
20 LENORE E. WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 10, 16 (1984)
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Many of the women held jobs in which they were delegated some
measure of responsibility 21 Many battered women come from middle-
class families, not all have children, and many are successful career
women.22 Their demographic profiles are diverse, with battered women
found "in all age groups, races, ethmc and religious groups, educational
levels, and socioeconomic groups. '23 The battered woman may have low
self-esteem, hold traditional views about the woman's role m the home,
believe she is responsible for the batterer's conduct, and deny the anger
she feels toward the batterer. She may also have the strength to mampu-
late her environment m order to postpone the violence and prevent, or
delay, the abuser from killing her. She may believe that she alone can
help herself to escape her predicament.24 Battered women may live a
dual existence. They may put a capable, confident face forward in their
public lives and at home slip into a passive role over which their batterer
has uncanny control. These are, of course, generalities with no one
woman fitting all of the characteristics described. However, this general
description serves to effectively dispel the false stereotype of the battered
woman and to help demonstrate that battered women are people with
whom everyone might identify in some way
Dr. Sara Young, a clinical psychologist whose practice involves the
treatment of victims of abuse who have survived their abusive relation-
ships, explains that there are numerous variations on the themes
associated with abusive relationships.25 Each individual's experience
must be evaluated and understood in the context in which it has occurred
and not by comparison to some ngid standard or list of criteria.26
Dr. Walker's research also developed a fundamental profile of the
batterer. The batterer probably learned his violent behavior over a long
period of time.27 He typically grew up in an environment where he was
exposed to violence and was rewarded for his inability to control his
anger and the resultant violent behavior. He suffered few consequences
because of ins behavior and he generally gained whatever it was he
[hereinafter WALKER, BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME].
21 Id. at 10.
22 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 18-19.
23 Id. at 19.
24 Id. at 3 1.
2 Interview with Dr. Sara Young, supra note 6.
26 Id. See generally Dutton, supra note 9, at 1191 (redefining battered
woman syndrome and delineating a unique evaluative approach for examining the
various responses women exhibit to domestic violence).
27 WALKER, BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 20, at 7
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sought to gain by his violence.2" He may suffer from low self-esteem,
hold traditional views about the male role in the home, blame others for
his actions, be extremely jealous, and believe his violence should not
invoke negative consequences.29 He, like his victim, may present a
different face to society than he assumes with his family;3 ° although
more recent research shows that many of these men exhibit violent
behavior against people or objects other than their mates.31 Generally,
the batterer knows that his conduct is unacceptable to society 3 2 He may
feel guilt and shame about hIs inability to control his actions and Dr.
Walker posits that if he were able to stop himself, he would.33
A large number of battering incidents occur during the heat of
summer, on weekends between six o'clock p.m. and midnight.34 The
violence generally takes place in the home, most frequently in the living
room or bedroom,35 and lasts for several hours with the most intense
battering occurring over a fifteen to thirty minute period.36 Eighty
percent of the physical violence is accompanied by verbal abuse.37 The
majority of the women do not respond with violence.3" This Note
focuses on some of those women who do.
The battering relationship is characterized by a cycle of violence.
This cycle was first documented by Dr. Walker and has been labeled the
Walker Cycle of Violence.39 There are three phases to this cycle. The
first is the tension building phase.40 It is characterized by nonviolent
hostility toward the woman and placating of the batterer by the woman.
This phase is thought to result in training the woman to think that she is
incapable of controlling the ultimate outcome by her responses to the
21 Id. Dr. Walker reports that 81% of batterers grew up in an environment
where they committed violent acts, witnessed violent acts and/or were the victims
of violent acts themselves. Id. at 35.
29 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 36.
30 id.
31 WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 20, at 35.32" WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 57
33 Id. at 26.
34 WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 20, at 24-25.
35 Id. at 25.
36 Id. at 27
37 Id. at 26.
38 id.
39 Id. at 95.
40 Id. at 95-96.
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batterer's hostility41 It is during this phase that the woman learns to
predict when the physical violence is likely to occur "by recogmzmg
specific predictive cues emitted by the batterer."' 2 Phase two is the acute
battering incident.43 This phase is rarely triggered by the victim's
behavior and is more commonly triggered by an external event." During
this phase there is a sharp decrease m the pent-up tension which m itself
is a source of reinforcement for the entire cycle.45 The third and final
phase is one of calm and loving respite." This period of contrition is
when the batterer feels remorse and promises never to batter again. He
mobilizes all of hIs charm and family support to convince the victim that
he can and will change. He exudes care and loving kindness. Dr. Walker
finds that tis period of contrition completes the process of victimza-
tion.47
To most observers it is perplexing that these women do not just leave
their abusers. Dr. Walker has concluded that this is due to complex
psychosocial reasons and has termed this psychological paralysis "learned
helplessness."48 Dr. Walker's theory is that a combination of societal
influences and control techniques by the batterer combine to convince the
abuse victim that there is no way out of the abusive relationship.49
Society sends messages to the woman that she should be passive,
complacent, and submissive and then neither provides protection through
the police, courts, or hospitals nor a safe haven when her home becomes
violent.5" The batterer uses social and economic isolation combined with
threats against the safety of the woman, and her friends and family, to
keep the woman with him." All of these forces combine to teach the
woman that she does not have control of her life.52 The fact that the
beatings continue no matter what she does to stop them decreases her
41 Id. This sequence of events has been termed the "unpredictable non-
contingency response/outcome pattern" and contributes to a state of learned
helplessness. Id. at 95. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
42 WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 20, at 102.
41 Id. at 96.
" WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 60.
4- WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 20, at 96.
46 Id. at 95-96.
41 Id., see also WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 65.
41 WALKER. THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 43.
49 Id. at 42-52.
s0 Id. at 43.
1' Id. at 51-52.
52 Id. at 52.
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motivation to try to change her circumstances."3 She begins to focus on
techniques of survival rather than escape skills.54 This narrowed focus
causes the battered victim to misperceive opportunities for escape.55
Eventually the period of contrition reoccurs and the woman convinces
herself that it was her fault, the batterer is really a good man and he will
stop beating her. Then the cycle begins again. Nothing short of termiat-
ing the relationship will end the violence,56 and some women terminate
the relationship by killing the abuser.
There are experts who feel that the term "learned helplessness" is a
misnomer and has done more harm than good. The cnticism of learned
helplessness focuses on the contradiction between the idea of helplessness
and the real actions of the victim.5" This contradiction may cause
disbelief of an expert who claims that the woman was unable to leave the
abusive setting. For instance, the victim of abuse might repeatedly bail
the abuser out of jail or resist police intervention after the police are
summoned to the scene of the abuse. These women who are supposedly
helpless are seen taking action in various aspects of their lives, giving an
appearance which is inconsistent with their label.59 It is ultimately
difficult to understand how one labelled as helpless can respond to her
tormentor with force, sometimes deadly force.
The experts who criticize the term "learned helplessness" embrace
instead the concept of "traumatic bonding" as an explanation for why
these women do not leave their abusive relationships.6" Traumatic
bonding is considered by these experts to be a more accurate description
of the dynamics which keep the victim of abuse in the relationship.6
The components of traumatic bonding are: (1) an inequity of power, for
example either physical and/or economic, causing the victim to be
dependent on her abuser, and (2) intermittent abuse and affection.62
These two components combine to create a more powerful bond between
-3 Id. at 45.
54 WALKER, BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 20, at 33.
55 Id.56Id. at 8.
"' Interview with Dr. Sara Young, supra note 6.
5 8 Id.
59 1d.
6 Id., see also CHARLEs P EwING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 19-20
(1987) (stating that traumatic bonding is a psychological explanation of why
battered women fail to leave their batterers).
61 Interview with Dr. Sara Young, supra note 6.
62 Id., EwING, supra note 60.
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the batterer and the victim than results from constant affection because
the effect is to cause the woman to believe she can shape the responses
of the man, and she is constantly trying to do so. 63 Tins belief that she
can change her circumstances combined with her dependency on the
abuser are what hold the victim of abuse m the abusive relationship.
Those victims of abuse who ultimately kill their tormentors are
frequently those that suffer the most violent abuse 4 and who, therefore,
perceive the most danger in their relationship. They kill, perhaps, because
of the isolation and the failure of the system to help them find a way out,
and because of a feeling that they alone must fend off the brutal
attacks. They have become trapped and sense that this time the batterer
intends to carry out his mortal threats.66 The battered woman alone is
best able to understand the level of violence of which her abuser is
capable and when that violence is about to escalate to extreme levels.6 7
Her violence is a desperate last attempt to protect herself.
I. KENTUCKY LAW
A. Cases
Kentucky case law on the admissibility of battered woman syndrome
is sparse. There are six cases which mention the issue,6 only four of
which raise battered woman syndrome m the context of a claim of self-
defense. 9 Only Dyer v. Commonwealth,0 Commonwealth v. Crag,71
63 Interview with Dr. Sara Young, supra note 6.
6' EWING, supra note 60, at 34-35.
61 WALKER, BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 20, at 40.
66 Id. at 42.
67 Dowd, supra note 7, at 574; Interview with Dr. Sara Young, supra note
6.
68 Dyerv Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1991); Commonwealthv
Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990), overruled by Dyer v Commonwealth, 816
S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1991); Commonwealthv Rose, 725 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 838 (1987), overruled by Commonwealth v. Craig, 783
S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990); Pruitt v Commonwealth, 700 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1985);
Lucas v. Commonwealth, 840 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992), rev. denied,
(Dec. 9, 1992); Ford v. Commonwealth, 720 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
69 Craig, 783 S.W.2d at 387; Rose, 725 S.W.2d at 589; Lucas, 840 S.W.2d
at 213; Ford, 720 S.W.2d at 736.
70 Dyer v Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1991).
71 Commonwealthv. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990), overruled by Dyer
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and Commonwealth v. Rose72 discuss this issue m any depth. An
analysis of the results m those cases reveals somewhat inconsistent
treatment of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. The women
who raised the battered woman syndrome to establish a claim of self-
defense in response to a murder charge were ultimately convicted of
manslaughter either in the first or second degree and were sentenced
to five to ten years in prison. The inconsistency surfaces in the
courts' attempts to define battered woman syndrome. Is it profile
evidence? Is it evidence of state of mind? Is it a medical condition
or diagnosis?
In Rose, all sevenjustices of the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed that
"as a general proposition, evidence of [battered woman syndrome] is
admissible after a proper foundation has been provided by evidence that
this is a mental condition constituting a recognized scientific entity and
that the witness is qualified to testify about it."73 The high court agreed
with the trial court that the expert testimony was properly admissible on
this issue but should be limited in this case to an explanation or
discussion of the syndrome.74 Ultimate conclusions or opinions were
excluded because the expert was a registered nurse and thus not qualified
to diagnose mental conditions.75
Three years later, the Kentucky Supreme Court split four to three and
reversed its conclusions in Rose, finding that the battered woman
syndrome was not "medical in nature., 76 The court grappled with the
word "syndrome" and its intended implications, concluding that it
represented a "set of concurrent things (as emotions or actions) that
usually form an identifiable pattern a characteristic pattern of
behavior [or] the emotional and behavioral characteristics of a person." 7
The court went on to remand the case, instructing the trial court not only
to permit testimony by a social worker on the "characteristics and
consequences of the battered wife syndrome'7' but also to permit the
v Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647 (Ky 1991).
72 Commonwealth v. Rose, 725 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1987), overruled by
Commonwealth v Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990).
73 Rose, 725 S.W.2d at 591 (emphasis added).
74 Id.
7S Id.
76 Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Ky. 1990), overruled by
Dyer v Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1991).77 Id. at 388.
71 Id. at 389.
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social worker to be qualified as an expert, thus allowing evidence of the
social worker's conclusions and opinions. 9
Twenty months after Craig, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in Dyer v.
Commonwealth, again discussed the battered woman syndrome, this time
in the context of a sodomy case. 0 The conclusion of this plurality
opinion is less clear than the court's decisions in Rose or Craig. The
court seemed at one point to equate evidence of battered woman
syndrome with mere profile evidence.8 Subsequently, the court identi-
fied battered woman syndrome as evidence of a mental condition
requiring qualified expert testimony to establish "that the condition is a
recognized scientific entity, and then tying the accused to this mental
state." 2 Dyer expressly overruled Craig on this point.8 3 After Dyer, the
position of the court appears to be that battered woman syndrome is a
medical condition. Conclusions that the defendant fits within this
syndrome shall be admitted only if the witness qualifies as an expert
(clinical psychologist or psychiatrist) and can establish that battered
woman syndrome is recognized by the scientific community as a
condition or diagnosis.
This discussion of the case law indicates the confusion caused in the
courts by the "syndrome" label. While the courts treat battered woman
syndrome as a psychiatric condition, experts in psychology currently
understand the issue in a broader context. Although there has been some
inconsistency among the experts themselves about what is encompassed
by the "syndrome," 84 there appears to be a trend to redefine the battered
woman syndrome.85 It is conceded that a relabelling at this late date
would generate further confusion; 6 therefore, the trend is to redefine
what is meant by the label "battered woman syndrome." As a result of
79 Id.
80 Dyer v Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647 (Ky 1991).
81 Id. at 653-54.
82 Id. at 654.
83 Id.
84 Dr. Walker alternately refers to battered woman syndrome as a "climcal
syndrome," a method of describing the "dynamics of the battering relationship,"
a "collection of symptoms" requiring "mental health providers who testify as
experts [to] incorporate these symptoms into whatever diagnostic system they
use," a subcategory of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and a separate listing in
the International Classification of Disease publication. Walker, supra note 11, at
32.
85 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
86 Dowd, supra note 7, at 577
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research which has continued since the label was first corned by Dr.
Walker, battered woman syndrome is intended to refer to a group of
responses to abuse with their numerous variations.87 The label is
intended to be a way to put the woman's actions in context so that they
may be explained to a jury 8 It is urged that battered woman syndrome
must be redefined because: "(1) testimony concerning the experiences of
battered women refers to more than their psychological reactions to
violence, and (2) battered women's diverse psychological realities are not
limited to one particular 'profile.' ,,89 The expert testimony could more
accurately be referred to as concerning battered women's "experiences"
in order to reflect the range of information it typically encompasses."
Unlike insanity, battered woman syndrome is neither a disorder nor a
defect.91 It is merely a reference to the battered woman's defense.92 It
is a term referring to evidence of the context of the crime and the
circumstances of the -battered woman's life which have groomed her
responses to the violence. It is an attempt to prove to the jury that she
has acted reasonably, under the circumstances, by using force in self-
defense.
B. Statutes
This Note examines the following five statutes:
(1) Kentucky Revised Statutes section 503.050. "Use of Physical
Force in Self-Protection; Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Acts of
Domestic Violence and Abuse." 93
(2) Kentucky Revised Statutes section 533.060. "Probation or Con-
ditional Release; Effect of Use of Firearm; Other Felonies."94
(3) Kentucky Revised Statutes section 439.3401. "Parole for Violent
Offenders; Applicability of Section to Victim of Domestic Violence or
Abuse. 'g5
87 Interview with Dr. Sara Young, supra note 6.
88 Dowd, supra note 7, at 574.
89 Dutton, supra note 9, at 1195.
90Id. at 1196.
"' Dowd, supra note 7, at 577
92 Id. at 574.
93 Ky. REv STAT. ANN. § 503.050 (Baldwin 1995).
94 Ky. REv STAT. ANN. § 533.060 (Baldwin 1995).
9' Ky. REv STAT. ANN. § 439.3401 (Baldwin 1995).
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(4) Kentucky Revised Statutes section 439.3402. "Exemption from
[Kentucky Revised Statutes section] 439.3401 for Victim of Domestic
Violence and Abuse; Procedures; Effect.
96
(5) Kentucky Revised Statutes section 403.720. "Definitions for
[Kentucky Revised Statutes sections] 403.715 to 403.785."97
These statutes are relevant to a criminal case in which the defendant
is a victim of domestic abuse charged with (or convicted of) a violent
crime against her abuser. The Kentucky self-protection statute, section
503.050, contains the traditional elements of a self-defense claim.98 The
defendant must prove: (1) she had a belief that physical force was
necessary for self-protection against an unlawful attack; (2) that the force
used was believed to be necessary to avoid imminent danger; and (3) the
force used was not in excess of that believed necessary to repel unlawful
attack.99 Furthermore, the statute justifies the use of deadly physical
force if the defendant "believes that such force is necessary to protect
[herself] against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, or sexual
intercourse compelled by force or threat."100 If the requirements of the
statute are met, its application has been limited in only a few discrete
contexts. 1 The problem for battered women has been fitting their
circumstances and conduct within the traditional self-defense require-
ments.
Kentucky's self-defense statute is a traditionally male-onented statute
applying best to situations typical of how two male adversaries respond
to each other when one threatens physical violence. The statute presumes
that if their physical strengths are comparable, the aggressor's threat is
generally met head on. When the violence involves a man against a
woman, the response is typically a different one. Women are generally
physically no match for a male aggressor and they are conditioned by
society to be meek and to restrain their aggressions. Furthermore, in the
domestic violence context they have experienced past physical abuse by
96 KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 439.3402 (Baldwin 1995).
97 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (Baldwin 1995).
98 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 503.050 (Baldwin 1995).
99 d. commentaryby Kentucky Crime Commission and Legislative Research
Commission (1974).
100 KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 503.050(2) (Baldwin 1995).
101 Use of force in self-defense is not justified if the defendant was: (1)
resisting arrest by a peace officer; (2) the initial aggressor without intent to kill
or seriously harm the victim; or (3) provoking another as an excuse to kill or
seriously harm them. Id. § 503.050 commentary by Kentucky Crime Commission
and Legislative Research Commission (1974).
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the aggressor demonstrating what he is both willing and capable of doing
to them. Therefore, women in general, and abused women in particular,
respond differently than men to threats of physical violence. Because,
generally, the abused woman is no match for her abuser in a direct
physical confrontation, she finds an indirect way to defend herself. For
these reasons, the justification of self-defense has not provided sufficient
protection to female victims of domestic violence who have indirectly
lashed out with violence in response to abuse.
Section 503.050 has undergone several changes begnig in 1974.
The 1974 amendments removed the requirement that the defendant prove
the reasonableness of her belief in the need to use force. "The fact that
unlawful force is not actually being threatened, that the amount of force
used is actually excessive, or that the individual's beliefs are unreasonable
does not strip [her] of the defense provided by this section."' 2 Section
503.050, however, is modified by section 503.120 which makes the self-
protection defense unavailable if a lesser mental state, such as wantonness
or recklessness, is sufficient to establish culpability, which is the case
with the crime of homicide. 0 3 The effect of this change is that if the
defendant's belief is honest, but unreasonable, she can claim the
justification of self-protection only to a crime in winch intent is a
prerequisite to culpability The justification is not available to exonerate
her from "a lesser degree of criminality if [her] conduct based upon that
belief constitutes wantonness or recklessness."'0 4 This may explain why
many battered women claiming self-defense in the homicide of their
abuser are convicted of manslaughter. If a jury determines that a battered
woman was unreasonable in deciding that she needed to defend herself
with force or m determining the amount of force she needed to employ,
a claim of self-defense will not preclude a conviction based on a lesser
mental state. The question then is what is the standard for determining the
reasonableness of the defendant's belief?
In 1992 a third subsection was added to section 503.050 providing
that "[a]ny evidence presented by the defendant to establish the existence
of a prior act or acts of domestic violence and abuse as defined in
102 id.
103 KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 503.120 (Baldwin 1995).
'4 Id. commentary by Kentucky Crime Commission andLegislativeResearch
Commssion (1974). One acts wantonly when she "is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the
circumstance exists." KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 501.020(3) (Baldwin 1995). One
acts recklessly when she "fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the result will occur or that the circumstances exists." Id. § 501.020(4).
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[Kentucky Revised Statutes section] 403.720 by the person against whom
the defendant is charged with employing physical force shall be
admissible under this section."10 5 Certainly the reasonableness of the
defendant's belief was intended to be determined in the context of the
violence in which the defendant lived day-to-day If not, there is no point
in admitting the evidence of abuse under section 503.050(3). It would
also seem appropriate that the jury be instructed to consider evidence
offered pursuant to section 503.050(3) in determining if her belief was
reasonable. Perhaps an instruction referring to the reasonable battered
woman or the reasonable victim of domestic abuse or violence would be
in order.
There is an absence of case law to explain the application of this
newest amendment. It raises some interesting questions. What effect, if
any, does this subsection have on the traditional elements required to
establish a claim of self-defense? Are victims of domestic violence still
required to establish that they acted out of fear and that there is a causal
link between their act of violence and the abuse to which they were
subjected at the hands of their victim? On its face, the amendment
appears to be a rule of evidence mandating the admissibility of any
evidence of domestic abuse or violence proffered by the defendant. Was
that rule the intent of the legislature? Is that how it would be applied in
reality9 How broadly is this rule to be interpreted? Will evidence of any
prior act of domestic violence be admitted or is there some temporal
requirement? Will the court permit expert testimony to establish a causal
relationship between the history of violence suffered by the defendant and
their own act of violence in order to explain the battered woman's state
of mind? Will the court instruct the jury that the evidence of abuse can
be taken into consideration in evaluating the imminence of the threat and
the reasonableness of the defendant's actions? These were among the
queries posed to the subjects of the interviews discussed in the next
portion of this Note. 6
Also relevant to tus topic is the statute which delineates the
eligibility of violent offenders for probation. 107 In general, a defendant
found guilty of a Class A, B, or C felony which involved the use of a
105 KY. REv STAT. ANN. § 503.050(3) (Baldwin 1995). Domestic violence
and abuse is defined as "physical injury, serious physical mjury, sexual abuse,
assault, or the infliction of fear of immment physical injury, serious physical
injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family members or members of an
unmarried couple." Id. § 403.720(1).
106 See infra Part H.
107 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 533.060 (Baldwin 1995).
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firearm is not eligible for probation, shock probation, or conditional
discharge.' There is one exception to this rule. If the defendant proves
that the person against whom the firearm was used "had previously or
was then engaged in an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse
against either the person convicted or a family member of the person
convicted," she is exempt from the application of this statute.'0 9 The
statute further requires that upon a claim of exemption by the convicted
defendant, "the trial judge shall conduct a hearing and make findings to
determine the validity of the claim and applicability of this exemp-
tion. 1
10
In effect, this statute seems to provide a second bite at the apple to
violent offenders who are also victims of domestic abuse. If they are
unsuccessful in establishing a claim of self-defense, they can try for
probation under the exemption provided by section 533.060. How is this
statute applied? Will the judge be required to hold a separate hearing on
the issue of domestic abuse? What type of findings is the court required
to make? What type of evidence will be admitted and required to support
the defendant's claim? Will one act of violence suffice? Once again, will
there be a requirement of a temporal link between the abuse and the
defendant's violent act? What is the intended breadth of this subsection?
Does it encompass siblings killing on behalf of an abused sibling? Does
the exemption automatically apply if its applicability is established?
Failure to establish a claim of self-defense or eligibility for probation
leaves the defendant who is also a victim of domestic abuse one final
avenue for relief. Section 439.3401 provides the guidelines for eligibility
of violent offenders for parole. While the general parole rules provide
that the defendant must serve twenty percent of her sentence before
becoming eligible for parole,"' section 439.3401 requires that violent
offenders must serve additional time before they are considered for
parole." 2 Under a 1992 amendment to section 439.3401, however,
108 Id. § 533.060(1).
.09 Id., see also supra note 105. A family member is defined as "a spouse,
including a former spouse, a parent, a child, a stepchild, or any other person
related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree." KY. REV STAT.
ANN. § 403.720(2) (Baldwin 1995).
11o KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 533.060(1) (Baldwin 1995).
in See id. § 439.340; 501 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:030 (1996).
12 A violent offender found guilty of a "capital offense, Class A felony, or
Class B felony involving the death of the victim, or rape in the first degree or
sodomy in the first degree of the victim, or serious physical injury to a victim"
must serve a mimmum amount of her sentence before becoming eligible for
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defendants who are victims of domestic violence are treated differently
Tis amendment, subsection (4), provides an exception to the parole rules
governing violent offenders. Subsection (4) states that the additional time
requirements for violent offenders do not apply to victims of domestic
abuse. In other words, violent offenders who are determined by the court
to be victims of domestic abuse are removed from the violent offender
parole rules and are eligible for parole after serving twenty percent of
their sentence. Thus the special parole rules for violent offenders are not
applicable to one adjudged to be "a victim of domestic violence or abuse
with regard to the offenses involving the death of the victim or
serious physical injury to the victim....
Section 439.3401 was enacted on July 15, 1992, and was made
retroactive to July 15, 1986.114 Defendants convicted during tis
window of time who were victims of domestic abuse can now petition the
court for a ruling that they were a victim of domestic violence and
therefore eligible for parole after serving twenty percent of their sentences
rather than fifty percent. Section 439.3402 outlines in detail the procedure
which the court must employ upon motion by the offender seeking
application of the exemption contained in section 439.3401(4).
It is the application and interplay of the above mentioned statutes
with which this Note is concerned. The interpretation of these laws
should reflect the current legal view of domestic violence and its victims.
Are victims of domestic abuse being sent the message that they will not
be held accountable for the consequences of their actions? Is it such a bad
thing to give these defendants several opportunities to plead their case of
justification? Are the laws belatedly beginmng to recogmze and address
a real and pervasive problem in our society, the problem of domestic
violence? Has the legislature gone to the other extreme over the domestic
violence issue? These are the questions addressed in the remainder of this
Note, with various perspectives provided by the judges, prosecutors,
parole. Ky. REV STAT. ANN. § 439.3401(1) (Baldwin 1995). A defendant
convicted of a capital offense or Class A felony and sentenced to life in prison
with a possibility of parole must serve at least twelve years of her sentence
before being considered for parole. Id. § 439.3401(2). A defendant convicted of
a capital offense or Class A felony and sentenced to a term of years or convicted
of a Class B felony is not eligible for parole until fifty percent of her sentence
has been served. Id. § 439.3401(3).
113 Id. § 439.4301(4). Excluded from this exceptionare defendants convicted
of first degree rape or first degree sodomy. Id.
114 Id. § 439.3401(5).
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defense attorneys, experts, and parole board members who deal with these
cases.
HI. ITERVIEWS
The author interviewed nine Kentucky circuit court judges, an
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney from Fayette County, an Assistant
Public Advocate, the chairperson of the Kentucky Parole Board, and a
climcal psychologist who treats victims of domestic abuse. The informa-
tion collected from the interviews conducted is, of course, the result of
a non-scientific study and the results will be reported in a like manner.
The responses of the nine judges interviewed will be reported as a group,
rather than individually 11 The comments of the judges are the product
of their general legal expertise because none had heard a case rising
these specific statutes in the context of domestic violence. Therefore,
none had been fully briefed on the issues.
The majority of the judges interviewed felt that section 503.050, in
effect, expands the concept of self-defense. Although the requirements of
the defense are the same - fear, resulting in the belief that use of force
is required; reasonableness of the belief; imminence of the danger,
appropriateness of the amount of force used - section 503.050(3) alters
these requirements by allowing them to be considered in the context of
domestic violence and from the perspective of a victim of such violence.
One judge commented that the effect of section 503.050(3) is to give the
status as a victim of abuse more weight through statutory recognition.
The general consensus of the judges was that this subsection provides
some form of additional consideration for this class of defendants in
establishing a claim of self-defense. This conclusion is consistent with the
statutory definition of "imminent" which provides expressly for tis
additional consideration." 6 "Imminent" is defined as "impending
danger, and, in the context of domestic violence and abuse belief that
danger is imminent can be inferred from a past pattern of repeated serious
abuse."" 7 This additional consideration allows battered women who kill
to establish a claim of self-defense despite the absence of an immediate
threat of danger if they know, from past experience, that the violence is
about to erupt.
11' Interviews with Kentucky circuit court judges (Feb. 29 - Mar. 27, 1996).
116 Ky. REV STAT. ANN. § 503.010 (Baldwin 1995).
117 Id.
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The Fayette County Commonwealth's Attorney's office viewed
section 503.050(3) in much the same way ... Although stating that this
subsection did not result in changing the requirements of a self-defense
claim, specifically the requirement of an imminent threat of danger,
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney Tamra Gormley proceeded to
express the view that battered women can fit under the self-defense
statute. She acknowledged that it is unfair to ask a woman to wait until
she is attacked by her abuser to respond with force in order to meet a
rigid definition of what constitutes imminent danger. The Assistant
Commonwealth's Attorney pointed out that section 503.050(3) does not
change the presentation of a claim of self-defense because all of the
evidence admissible under that subsection could have been brought in
without the mandatory language in the statute because it goes to the
mental state of the defendant.
Linda Smith, an attorney with the Department of Public Advocacy
("DPA") agreed that the elements of a claim of self-defense are unaltered
by section 503.050(3). She stated, however, that the effect was to allow
the requirements, and the defendant's state of mind, to be evaluated in the
context of domestic violence. 19
Many of the judges bristled at the inqury as to whether section
503.050(3) was a rule of evidence mandating admissibility of prior acts
of domestic violence or abuse by the victim of the crime which is
presented by the defendant. 20 Seven of the nine judges concluded
quickly that this was not a rule of evidence. They said that admissibility
of this evidence was subject to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence,
specifically Rules 403 and 404, and the discretion of the court. It was
pointed out that judicial discretion is fundamental and, that without it, all
11 Interview with Tamra Gormley, Esq., Assistant Commonwealth's Attor-
ney for Fayette County, in Lexington, Ky. (Mar. 21, 1996).
19 Interview with Linda A. Smith, Esq., Assistant Public Advocate with the
Department of Public Advocacy, in LaGrange, Ky. (Mar. 29, 1996).
120 Interestingly, this mandate of admissibility seemingly contradicts KY.
REv STAT. ANm. § 403.780 (Baldwin 1995) that prohibits the admission of
testimony from a domestic abuse hearing in a subsequent criminal proceeding
involving the same parties. The result of the hearing (i.e., an Emergency
Protective Order) would presumably be admissible, but what result if the
testimony given in the hearing is contradicted to the detriment of the defendant
in a subsequent criminal proceeding? Wuch statute controls - section 503.050
mandating the admissibility of the testimony as evidence of abuse or section
403.780 prohibiting the admission of the same evidence? This interesting
dilemma was posed by one of the judges during is interview for this Note.
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that is needed is an admimstrator to blindly apply the law and that the
source of protection from abuse of this discretion is the electoral process.
Several of these judges explained that the Kentucky Rules of Evidence
provide for broad admissibility of the mental state of the defendant and
that this evidence is frequently allowed in. However, to be so admitted,
the evidence must be competent, relevant, and substantiated. One judge
speculated that a preliminary hearing on the admissibility of evidence of
domestic abuse would be required.
One judge read section 503.050(3) literally, concluding that it
mandated admissibility and that it was up to the jury to determine the
relevance of the evidence. This judge's view was that life is not lived in
a vacuum; therefore, even an old incident of domestic violence may have
affected the defendant's state of mind at the tune of the crime. This judge
had faith that the jury would be able to disregard evidence that was not
pertinent to the claim of self-defense.
Another judge never expressed his view about how he read this
statute. He did predict that it would be applied in as many different ways
as there were judges who applied it, with the final interpretation being
determined by a higher court on appeal.
It was suggested by more than one judge that section 503.050(3)
creates a separation of powers issue due to the encroachment of the
legislature on an issue reserved to the judiciary It was further explained
that the court gets jealous when the legislature gets involved in the rules
of court and that the apparent attempt of section 503.050(3) to interfere
with the court's discretion is an example of perceived inappropriate
legislative action. The court has a constitutional basis for this jealousy
The Kentucky Constitution provides for the division of "[t]he powers of
the government into three distinct departments.""12 Furthermore, it
is provided that "[n]o person being of one of those departments, shall
exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others."'22 The
power to prescribe the "rules of practice and procedure for the Court of
Justice" is exclusively vested in the Supreme Court of the state. 2 3 The
concept of comity among the different branches of government provides
121 KY. CONST. § 27
122 Id. § 28.
123 Id. § 116; O'Bryan v Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Ky. 1995)
(holding that statute mandating admission of evidence of collateral source
payments violated constitutional separation of powers); see also Kupnon v
Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1994) (discussing the constitutionality of the
Jefferson Family Court project and the appointment of district judges to hear
dissolution actions).
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for "judicial adoption of a rule unconstitutionally enacted by the
legislature 'not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and
respect."" 24 Generally, comity is only given to an unconstitutionally
enacted statute when it enhances, rather than impairs, the judicial
function. 25 The overwhelming majority of judges interviewed felt that
the effect of section 503.050(3) was an impairment of the court's
discretion m determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence, an
issue of practice and procedure exclusively reserved to the judicial branch
of government.
Ms. Gormley, the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney, observed that
the language of section 503.050(3) appears to be mandatory, but that was
in effect irrelevant because this type of evidence is generally admitted
since it goes to the defendant's state of mind.'26 Ms. Smith, with the
Department of Public Advocacy, retorted that whether all of the evidence
establishing the defendant's state of mind is admitted depends on the
court, and that the effect of section 503.050(3) is to ensure that the
evidence does get admitted.'2 7 Noting that the statute mandates the
admissibility of "any evidence," Ms. Smith concluded that admissibility
of the evidence is taken out of the judge's discretion and furthermore,
that this language includes testimony by an expert witness on the issue
of domestic violence and abuse.
21
The prevailing view of the judges on the issue of expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome was that such testimony is probably prohibited
by the Kentucky Supreme Court. It was thought by most of those
interviewed that the inadmissibility was due to the fact that the syndrome
has not been scientifically substantiated and accepted. Most of the judges
recognized the usefulness to the jury of expert testimony on the issue of
the effect of domestic violence on the mental state of the defendant but
stated that they would not admit testimony on the battered woman
syndrome. Perhaps, if the question had been posed to the judges omitting
the word "syndrome," more would have found the expert testimony
admissible. Several conceded that they would allow evidence of the abuse
and its effects, for instance, by the defendant's treating physician. One
judge concisely stated that allowing in the evidence and allowing
124 0'Bryan, 892 S.W.2d at 577 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242
(5th ed. 1979)).
125 Id.
126 Interview with Tamnra Gormley, supra note 118.
127 Interview with Linda A. Smith, supra note 119.
128 id.
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testimony on the concept are two different things entirely Only one judge
felt that expert testimony was not needed in domestic violence cases.
The view of the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney was that expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome was a valid method of
establishing a claim of self-defense, but that it was unclear what the
position of the Kentucky Supreme Court would be on the issue.'2 9
There have not been any reported cases in Kentucky on this issue since
1991. As yet unanswered is the effect on the admissibility of battered
woman syndrome under the more flexible standard for the admission of
expert testimony developed in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals. 30
It was unanimous among all those interviewed that the traditional
self-defense instructions would be given to the jury without alteration
despite the admission during the trial of evidence of domestic abuse of
the defendant by the victim. The reasons offered for this result included
the belief that an instruction would not be required for the jury to link the
abuse with the defendant's state of mind. In addition, it was stated that
adding any instructions regarding the evidence of abuse would further
complicate the self-defense instructions, which are already too complicat-
ed. Furthermore, if additional instructions were to be given by the court,
the prosecution would argue that the result would be undue emphasis on
the issue of domestic violence or battered woman syndrome.131 It is
curious to the author that evidence would be admitted to establish the
defendant's state of mind and the context in which the crime occurred but
that no instruction would be given to direct the jury to evaluate the claim
of self-defense from the perspective of a victim of domestic violence.'
Domestic violence victims convicted of violent crimes receive
consideration for probation under section 533.060. The statute directs the
court to hold a hearing to determine the validity of the domestic violence
claim. The judges were asked if they would conduct a separate hearing
for these purposes. If the issue of domestic violence had not been raised
in the guilt phase of the trial, most judges said that they would hold a
129 Interview with Tamra Gormley, supra note 118.
130 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In
Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Frye test, which required that an
expert's testimony have general acceptance m the scientific community to be
admissible. The Court established a more flexible test based on the methodology
and validity of the scientific evidence as well as the level of scrutiny and
acceptanceby the scientific community
131 Interview with Tamra Gormley, supra note 118.
132 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
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separate hearing. The general consensus was, however, that the credibility
of the defendant's claim of being a victim of domestic abuse would be
compromised by the failure to raise the issue during the guilt phase of the
trial. The hearing would be held before final sentencing, and one judge
noted that the defendant would have to establish her victim status by a
preponderance of the evidence. It is likely that the prosecution would
argue that the burden of proof should be clear and convincing evi-
dence.13
3
If the issue of domestic violence was raised in the guilt phase of the
trial, about half of the judges questioned would still hold a separate
sentencing hearing. During this hearing they would consider the evidence
admitted during the guilt phase as well as any additional evidence
relevant to the issue of whether the defendant was a victim of abuse by
the person against whom the defendant used violence. The other half of
the judges would consider the evidence produced at trial without
conducting a separate sentencing hearing on the issue.
One judge suggested that he would submit the determination of the
defendant's status as a victim of abuse to the jury if the evidence had
been presented at trial. If the jury verdict was that the defendant was
abused by her victim, then the exemption would apply If the jury
returned a verdict that the defendant was not a victim, then that judge
would hold a separate hearing for a determination of the issue by the
court.
It was thought by the judges that the trial court would be required to
make findings of fact on the issues of whether the alleged violence and
abuse actually occurred and were directed at the defendant, causing the
defendant to be a "victim" of such abuse. Most of the judges stated that
a broad range of evidence would be admitted in tlus hearing since it was
after the guilt phase of the trial and would pertain to the defendant's state
of mind. One problem anticipated by the judges was the ability of the
prosecution to refute this evidence if the defendant's abuser was dead.
One judge expressed the opinion that expert testimony would not be
needed at tus stage, and of course those not holding a separate hearing
would only consider that evidence of abuse admitted during the guilt
phase of the trial.
The mterviewees expressed no opinion about what quantity of
evidence would be required to establish victim status. Helen Howard-
Hughes, the chairperson of the Kentucky Parole Board, commented that
she has seen a disparity in the amount of evidence required, with some
133 Interview with Tamra Gormley, supra note 118.
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women found to be victims of domestic violence based on one piece of
evidence and others who presented substantial evidence of abuse found
by the court not to be a victim of domestic violence.'
Upon establishing her claim of being a victim of abuse at the hand
of her own victim, the defendant is not automatically probated. She now
comes within the exception stated in section 533.060 and it is within the
court's discretion to grant or deny probation. The Assistant Common-
wealth Attorney speculated that the judge probably would not grant
probation either because the defendant failed to raise the issue in the guilt
phase, thus diminshing the credibility of the evidence, or the defendant
did raise the issue of abuse but the jury did not buy it. Therefore, the
judge was not likely to be convinced, either.'35
At first blush the breadth of the exception contained in section
533.060 seems excessive. As written, the statute permits a defendant to
come within the exception even if the defendant was not the victim of
abuse. The exception applies if the defendant committed his or her act of
violence on behalf of a family member who was the victim of abuse.
This breadth did not disturb any of those interviewed. It was recognized
that this generally is a natural reaction - to act to protect one's family -
and the statute merely permits the court to exercise its discretion as the
circumstances require in deciding whether to grant probation. It was
noted, of course, that knowledge of the abuse must be established if the
defendant herself was not a victim of the abuse.
Section 430.3401 did not spark as much debate during the interviews.
Everyone agreed that the statute applied to those offenders convicted
before July 14, 1992, and after July 15, 1986. These violent offenders can
petition the court for a hearing on the issue of their status as a victim of
domestic violence and eligibility for parole after serving twenty percent
of their sentence.
If the offender was convicted after 1992, and the issue of domestic
abuse was raised during their trial and the court made a finding that they
were not a victim, then if they are a violent offender they must serve the
statutory minimum required by section 439.3401 before becoming eligible
for parole. If the court found the defendant to be a victim of abuse but
the jury determined that the defendant did not establish her claim of self-
defense and the court did not grant probation, the defendant is within the
exception in section 430.3401(4) and will be eligible for parole after
serving twenty percent of her sentence.
131 Interview with Helen Howard-Hughes, Chairperson of the Kentucky
Parole Board, in Frankfort, Ky. (Mar. 22, 1996).
"' Interview with Tamra Gormley, supra note 118.
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The result is less clear if the evidence of domestic violence was not
raised during any phase of a trial conducted after the enactment of the
1992 amendments facilitating consideration of evidence of domestic
violence. Can this violent offender subsequently petition the court for a
hearing to establish her status as a victim of abuse, therefore becoming
eligible for parole after serving only twenty percent of her sentence? One
judge felt that a hearing on the issue would not be available to the
defendant at this point. The Assistant Public Advocate maintained that a
post-conviction motion for a hearing on whether the defendant was
exempt from section 439.3401 was appropriate and consistent with the
language of the statute.
36
When asked for their thoughts on the intent behind the 1992
amendments to the above-mentioned statutes, the judges agreed that the
legislature must have intended to place defendants who are victims of
domestic violence in a separate class. This class of defendants is provided
multiple opportunities to rise the abuse in mitigation of their criminal
conduct. Most of the judges agreed that the legislature had the power to
do this and probably had done so in response to public clamor about the
prevalence of domestic violence today
Very few of those interviewed felt that domestic violence has
received unduly favorable treatment in the law One judge expressed the
view that the special protections afforded tius class of defendants by the
statutes risks portraying all women as weaklings in need of protection.
The interviewee also commented that the battered woman syndrome sends
the message, without directly saying so, that women are of diminished
capacity and cannot take care of themselves. Undoubtedly, some battered
woman do fit this description, but this judge feared that the rest of the
female gender would be hurt by the image created. Ms. Gormley
surmised that overuse or extreme emphasis on domestic abuse does risk
dimlnshing the credibility of legitimate victims of abuse who become
defendants in the criminal justice system. 137 For the most part, the
judges felt that the statutes permit flexibility and case-by-case determina-
tions which are required in these fact-specific cases.
A final topic that consistently came up during these interviews was
the recent grant of clemency by former Governor Brereton Jones to
several Kentucky female inmates. By June 1995, eighty-eight battered
women in twenty-one states had been granted clemency by a state
136 Interview with Linda A. Smith, supra note 119.
17 Interview with Tamra Gormley, supra note 118.
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governor. 38 On December 11, 1995, his last day in office, Governor
Brereton Jones granted clemency to ine battered women serving time in
Kentucky prisons.'39 The position of the Fayette County Common-
wealth's Attorney's Office regarding this grant of clemency is that it
circumvented the criminal justice system. It was pointed out that the jury
had heard all of the admissible evidence and still rendered a guilty
verdict. 40 The effect of the clemency hearings was to substitute the
judgment of the Parole Board, Governor, Department of Public Advoca-
cy, and Commission on Women for that of the jury following a one-sided
presentation of the evidence of domestic abuse on behalf of the offend-
er. 141
The Department of Public Advocacy imtially sought pardons from the
Governor for the women, but the Parole Board would not support them
in this petition. 42 When asked why the 1992 amendments to Ken-
tucky's self-defense and violent offender laws did not help these women
establish justification for their crime, the DPA responded with a laundry
list of reasons why the system did not work for these battered women.
Some of the women pled to a lesser offense out of fear that the jury
would not believe that domestic violence was a factor in their crime."
One actually was disbelieved despite presenting overwhelming evidence
of the abuse she had suffered at the hands of her victim.'" Others were
counseled by their attorneys that it would be futile to raise the abuse in
mitigation of their crime, or they raised a defense other than self-
defense, such as an accidental shooting defense, eliminating the need to
present the evidence of abuse. 14s
The Parole Board held victim hearings on each woman to allow
testimony from the victim's family and the Commonwealth's Attorney's
Office in that particular case.141 The Parole Board was able to consider
138 Justice forAbused Women, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), June 17,
1995, at 14A.
"' Interview with Helen Howard-Hughes, supra note 134; see also Judy
Mann, A Patchwork of Pain - and Hope, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1996, at D17
(discussing Gov. Jones's decision to grant clemency).
140 Interview with Tamra Gormley, supra note 118.
"4 Id.
1 Interview with Helen Howard-Hughes, supra note 134; Interview with
Linda A. Smith, supra note 119.
m Interview with Linda A. Smith, supra note 119.
1"Id., Interview with Helen Howard-Hughes, supra note 134.
'41 Interview with Linda A. Smith, supra note 119.
146 Interview with Helen Howard-Hughes, supra note 134.
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all of the evidence of abuse, including that evidence not admissible at
trial, giving the Board what Ms. Howard-Hughes referred to as "the
bigger picture."'"7 Governor Jones commuted part of the sentences of
eight of the nine women, bringing these women within the exception in
section 439.3401(4).14' The effect was to take these women out of the
violent offender act and make them eligible for parole after serving
twenty percent of their sentence, which these eight women had already
done.149 The remaining woman released had previously been determined
to fall within this exception but had not yet served twenty percent of her
sentence. 5 ' The Parole Board exercised their power to call this woman
for early consideration for parole and then granted her early parole."'
CONCLUSION
A few of those interviewed expressed the opimon that not all
Kentucky courts will take the issue of domestic violence seriously and
enforce the statutes providing battered women additional protection. It
was alleged that in some areas domestic violence may be viewed as a
way of life and the battered woman will be told by participants m the
criminal justice system to go home and be a good wife. Hopefully this
prediction is maccurate. If not, it is a clear indication of the need for
education in this area of the law. Certainly, at this time, the statutes and
case law do not interrelate well. It is the intent of the legislature to
liberally and consistently admit evidence of domestic abuse in these cases.
In reality, admissibility will depend on the discretion of the court before
whom the evidence is presented.
Tamra Gormley, who is clearly an advocate for victims of domestic
violence,'52 said that battered women who kill must be charged by the
state. 53 It is not up to an individual Commonwealth's Attorney to
decide that the defendant's conduct was justified. It is up to the jury to
decide the validity of the alleged abuse of the defendant and to what
147 id.
148 id.
'49 id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Gormley has been appointed as the director of the Victims Advocacy
Division of Kentucky's Attorney General's Office. Short Tales: Gormley to Head
Victims AdvocacyDivision, THE HERALD-LEADER (Lexington), Sept. 4, 1996, at
B3.
113 Interview with Tamra Gormley, supra note 118.
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extent her circumstances dictate a finding that she acted in self-de-
fense. 154 The risk is that juries will not believe the evidence of abuse
and the effect it can have on the battered woman. Linda Smith contends
that juries rarely do believe the evidence, especially if there is a time lag
between the abuse and the criminal conduct. 55 She attributes this at
least in part to the societal norm that women are not allowed to be
violent and are viewed by society as abhorrent if they are.' 56 They are
not expected to respond to anything with force and when they do they are
pumshed disproportionately to males, and if they are black women, "they
really get smacked" by the system. 157
Kentucky is in the forefront of developing legislation dealing with
domestic violence. Education is still needed on the issue of domestic
violence and on the laws in place to deal with it. Judges, attorneys, and
the public all need exposure to this information. Dr. Sara Young shared
that her clients have told her of some of the most "mind-blowing acts of
abuse on God's earth.' 58 When the readers hear of violence of this
nature they should stop and remind themselves of what they have learned
about what keeps the abuse victim in the relationship, because the knee-
jerk reaction when hearing of this abuse is to question why the victims
stay Dr. Young suggests that we open our minds to the information
instead of assuming that we know all that there is to know about
domestic violence and its victims.'5 9 She also suggests that we view the
abuser's conduct outside the context of the home and recognize it for
what it is - criminal behavior.6 Domestic violence is a crime and
should be treated as such. Dr. Young advises that courts must face the
fact that counselling is generally ineffective in dealing with this criminal
behavior and that the abuser usually cannot be rehabilitated through
counselling except in the earliest stages and in the least severe cases.'
Battered women do not have a license to kill and they do not need
a defense separate from that of self-protection. What they do need is a
system that is responsive to their predicament and a system that permits
them to effectively present their case to the jury in order to explain the
experiences which have culminated in their criminal conduct. Kentucky
I4 id.
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has the necessary laws in place to allow tis to happen. The challenge is
to become familiar with these laws and the contexts in which they apply
and to use them to prevent victims of abuse from being subsequently
abused by the legal system.

